posted 08-28-2010 08:05 AM
Detection of deception using fMRI: Better than chance,
but well below perfectionGeorge T. Monteleone, K. Luan Phan, Howard C. Nusbaum, Daniel Fitzgerald,
and John-Stockton Irick University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Stephen E. Fienberg Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
John T. Cacioppo University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
"Functional brain imaging has been considered a new and better technique for the detection of deception.
The reasoning is that there is a neural locus or circuit for lying that is sensitive, specific, generalizable across individuals and measurement contexts, and robust to countermeasures. To determine the extent to which the group results predicted lying at the level of the individual, we reanalyzed data on 14 participants from a study that had previously identified regions involved in lying (thus satisfying the criterion for sensitivity). We assessed the efficacy of functionally determined brain regions based on the lie_truth contrast for N - 1 participants to detect deception in the Nth individual. Results showed that no region could be used to correctly detect deception across all individuals. The best results were obtained for medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), correctly identifying 71% of participants as lying with no false alarms. Lowering the threshold for a response increased hits and false alarms.
The results suggest that although brain imaging is a more direct index of cognition than the traditional polygraph, it is subject to many of the same caveats and thus neuroimaging does not appear to reveal processes that are necessarily unique to deception."
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Ted-
I wish it worked, but like polygraph, it is not a lie-detector. That is the trap this company is falling into. They are looking for CNS structures that are unique to deception. Perhaps in a CIT paradigm there may be some use, given the current level of development, but not in a CQT. Even the study I referenced above employed a card based version of a CIT (or Guilty Knowledge Test as they refer to it)where results of the fMRI may reflect deception, recognition or any combination thereof. There seems a paucity of scientific studies using fMRI in a CQT paradigm. Perhaps this is because of the difficulties of expanding it to that arena, or perhaps those with access to an fMRI don't have faith in the CQT and are not in a hurry to endorse it via an fMRI study.
Either way, even if imaging studies could work in a CIT paradigm, so does EDA alone, and it is a lot easier to capture. CIT sill always suffer from the same deficiencies that have been historically identified. See the below section from Honts and Schweinle (2009) .
"An alternative PDD method is the concealed knowledge
test. The concealed knowledge test asks multiple-choice
questions about information that only the guilty person
should know. The concealed knowledge test has some
highly desirable psychometric characteristics and it is possible
to statistically model the likelihood of false positive
outcomes. Unfortunately, the concealed knowledge test is
difficult or impossible to apply in many forensic (Podlesny
1993, 2003) and screening settings and it appears prone to
false negative errors in field settings (see reviews by Honts
et al. 2008; Vrij 2008).
Proponents of the concealed knowledge test also maintain
that it has a sound basis in orienting response theory
(Ben-Shakhar and Furedy 1990). However, the theoretical
base within orienting response theory only applies if the
guilty person can be expected to recognize details from
the crime scene and if those details have signal value for the
individual. Determining whether or not the guilty person is
likely to remember details from the crime scene, and whether
or not those details have signal value is the province of the
science concerning eyewitness memory. The eyewitness
memory literature is voluminous, and clearly indicates that
eyewitness memory is fragile, generally poor for crime
details, varies inversely with arousal, and is subject to
extensive post-event distortion (see Kassin et al. 2001, for a
list of generally accepted findings from the eyewitness
memory literature). Since the perpetrator of a crime is also
necessarily an eyewitness, and all of the information available
to the perpetrator about the crime comes to him or her
though eyewitness processes, the concealed information test
is ultimately limited by the quality of the eyewitness/
perpetrators’ memory. The situational characteristics of the
commission of many criminal acts are likely to contain a list
of variables known to degrade eyewitness memory, including
but not limited to, stress, limited opportunity to observe,
intoxication and the opportunity for misleading post-event
information to replace the original memories. One study
clearly demonstrated that post-event misinformation can
dramatically reduce the validity of the concealed knowledge
test (Amato-Henderson et al. 1996).
Currently the concealed knowledge test is essentially
without application in PDD practice (with the exception of
Japan, where it is applied in only 0.25% of criminal cases,
S. Hira, personal communication, March 24, 2009). For
these reasons, the focus of the present paper, including all
of the studies and data we reference, are from studies of the
CQT and not the concealed knowledge test. Readers
interested in a detailed discussion of both testing techniques
and their various strengths and weaknesses are
referred to the reviews by Honts et al. (2008) and
Vrij (2008)."
[This message has been edited by Mad Dog (edited 08-28-2010).]